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Realism and Rule-Following 





In the most general sense, realism can be described as the philosophical posi-
tion according to which there is a mind-independent world, and moreover we humans 
can come to know something about it. In such a general form, this position has found 
applications in various areas, such as the question of universals, the question of sci-
entific discourse, the question about moral predicates, the explanation of perception, 
and the question of evidence-transcending truths. In this paper, my general aim is to 
offer at least one satisfactory way of seeing how realism can also be crucial in under-
standing rule-following. 
I will be understanding rule-following as an activity that involves the intention 
of being consistent in keeping to some standard or norm. Examples of such activity 
occur in the use of words, the movement of chess pieces, the adoption of certain 
behaviour patters that are considered acceptable and thus good, and the avoidance of 
others considered bad. Most of the work done in explaining rule-following, in the tra-
dition of analytic philosophy, has been in the area dealing with the use of words, the 
area called semantic normativity. My strategy will be to start from the main results 
obtained up to now in this area of semantic normativity and then try to apply them to 
other areas, the most important of which is the area of the behaviour of people who, in 
general, desire to do good and avoid evil. 
First, one must recall some fundamental aspects of rule-following. Being 
rational involves being able to treat something as a rule. This, however, can only be 
done if some conditions are satisfied regarding the nature of rules. The most intrigu-
ing condition is that the rule in question must be a normative constraint over an 
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indefinite variety of cases, so that one can determine the correct response in each of 
those cases. The well-known problem here is to see how something that is normative 
over an indefinite number of cases can be suitably accessible to a finite mind. 
 In trying to solve this problem in the area of semantic normativity, the normal 
procedure is to consider a very simple arithmetical rule as a model of semantic rules. 
Take the rule of addition. It can be shown that, if we start with a finite number of 
typical cases of addition, with the idea of showing what addition means, then nothing 
can guarantee that novel cases should follow suit. In other words, any rule identifiable 
from a finite number of cases is underdetermined. Other rules may be consistent with 
the finite number of cases and yet diverge at some future point from the usual addition 
rule we are familiar with (Wittgenstein 1953, § 197-202; Kripke 1982; Boghossian 
1989; Baker and Hacker 1985; Holtzman and C. Leich 1981; Pettit 1990; Wright 
1984). 
So the question is: once I go beyond the domain of the exemplary cases, what 
is it that keeps me on the right track? What makes me stick to a rule and not extend 
the application to new cases in an irregular way? The initial procedure of rule-fol-
lowing is quite clear. There are two steps. First, I take certain cases to exemplify a 
particular rule; second, I extrapolate from the rule towards new cases by letting the 
inclination that has been thereby generated lead me on. These are not problematic 
steps. What causes concern is what follows. There must be something that further 
distinguishes between following the rule rightly from following it wrongly. If I cannot 
in principle be ever mistaken in following a rule beyond its exemplary cases, then 
there can be no rule-following. This is certainly counter-intuitive because we do find 
ourselves following various rules with considerable success. So, an account is needed 
to explain why people are pushed to extrapolate consistently in one direction and not 
in another, even after they run out, as it were, of the exemplary cases. 
Following the lead of Wittgenstein, some philosophers have argued that the 
criterion of correctness, at least as regards meaning, is derived from what members of 
the meaning-generating community actually do, in other words, the criterion is 
derived from the practice (e.g. Kripke 1982). One way of understanding their main 
argument is in terms of explanation. Consider the following explanation: 
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This group is behaving in this regular way because it is following rules R1, R2, 
R3, ... 
 
Is this an acceptable explanation? It seems not. On closer scrutiny, one realises that 
the explanation is vacuous. We give the impression we are explaining the regular 
behaviour in terms of rules, forgetting that our concept of rule is itself understandable 
only in terms of regular behaviour. If asked what it means to act according to rule R1, 
we have nothing else to say than that to act according to rule R1 means doing 
something in a regular way. If we repeat this for R2, R3, and the rest, we see that the 
explanation is just circular. We are effectively saying that  
 
This group is behaving in this regular way because it is behaving in a regular 
way. 
 
What we should do is have the explanation go the other way round. We should not 
explain the practice by alluding to rules but explain the occurrence of rules by refer-
ring to the practice. A practice within a group should not be seen as a product of rule-
following. On the contrary, a social practice is best seen as a generator of a set of 
rules, rather than the result of following them. One may concede here that, to some 
extent, rules have a limited but significant role as ‘causes’ of practice. This occurs 
when ‘new-comers’ to a group need socialisation to be initiated in the practice under 
consideration. This role of rules however should not be exaggerated and given 
absolutely priority, as if it were indispensable also to those established members of 
the group who are in no need of initiation. The major conclusion remains therefore 
that the ultimate source of normativity in rule-following is located in the community 
as it engages in a given practice.  
To illustrate this fundamental point, it is useful perhaps to mention how 
Wittgenstein extended this idea in order to give an original account of mathematics. 
For him, a mathematical proof is not a novel application of established rules, nor a 
discovery of hidden mathematical structures, but a creative way of changing a 
common inclination among the community of specialists (Wittgenstein 1979a IV §30, 
VII §9; 1979b p. 185-6). This change of inclination involves the act of convincing 
others of something they had never imagined before. The mathematician originator of 
a new mathematical proof or concept has the task of doing something that will 
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convince his colleagues that what he does is essentially supplying a proof. For 
example, when mathematicians proved that denumerable infinity, ℵ0 , is a number, 
they went through a procedure that convinced their colleagues that they have indeed 
supplied a proof.  
The proof itself is part of the novelty. For Wittgenstein, mathematical proofs 
are taken as paradigms within which a particular language-game is possible. Not 
everything is allowed, however. In fact, for this particular example, he thinks 
mathematicians are mistaken whenever they use the expression ‘the number of 
elements in an infinite series’ as if it had a clear meaning. The use of ℵ0 as a number 
is judged by him as an inappropriate grammatical inclination. His attitude here shows 
that he did not consider the criterion for acceptance or rejection of novelty a simple 
democratic process of establishing the major trends in the various communities of 
mathematicians. What distinguishes him from the conventionalist is the fact that, for 
him, the criterion is the legitimacy of subtle changes in the meaning of central 
symbols used. It is a grammatical mistake to say that ‘has ℵ0 elements’, defined as 
‘can be 1-1 correlated with the set of naturals’, is equivalent to the ordinary phrase 
‘has p elements’ (Frascolla 1994, chap 3). This non-equivalence itself however is a 
matter of semantics, and thus embedded on the practice of the community. 
This mathematical example illustrates some of the possible ramifications of 
the claim that the ultimate source of normativity in rule-following is located in the 
community as it engages in a given practice. Adopting this view of rule-following 
makes it easy to understand how people can make mistakes in trying to follow a rule.  
I may be mistaken in thinking that the exemplary cases should lead me in a particular 
direction, which then turns out to be at variance with that expressed in the practice in 
which I am engaged. For example, in linguistic practice, I may think that I fully know 
what the word ‘cool’ means, and then realise that it’s use is also allowed in ways I 
didn’t know of before. Ultimately, one realises that dictionaries and manuals of 
grammar do not occupy a definite, normative position over and above the linguistic 
practice, but the other way round. Hence, rule-following as here understood involves 
the negotiation with others so as to ascertain that the rule-follower is not mistaken.  
This view has been challenged by those who argue that the source of norma-
tivity lies essentially within the individual (Blackburn 1984). Put simply, the 
argument starts from the observation that, when I am considering the third step in 
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rule-following, in other words when I want to account for the possibility not only of 
extrapolating from the exemplary cases but also of getting it right or wrong, then I 
need a guiding criterion to show me a red light if I go wrong. This criterion need not 
be something outside me, as was assumed up to now. It could be my disposition itself. 
Hence, I may negotiate with myself over time checking my present act of rule-
following with previous instances when I followed the same rule. This checking may 
result in the discovery that I’m not really faithful to my disposition. In this case, my 
rule-following is wrong, and needs correction. Such an account of rule-following is 
especially plausible when dealing with regularities a person engages in, and in which 
nobody else does, for example when a person acts in a certain regular way to ease a 
certain kind of pain he cannot describe in words. 
 This account can be called an individualist view, while the previous one a 
communitarian view. Taken on their own, both seem necessary but insufficient. A 
combination of both is more plausible. This is what has been suggested by Philip 
Pettit (1993 p. 76-106). According to a combined view, rule-following is best seen in 
the following terms. First, I take certain cases to exemplify a particular rule; second, I 
extrapolate from the rule towards new cases by letting the disposition that has been 
thereby generated lead me on; third, I check my move. The guiding criterion here 
involves two aspects. First there is negotiation with myself over time, to check 
whether I am indeed faithful to my disposition. Then there is also negotiation with 
others to check whether the practice in which I am engaged confirms my action or 
not. It may happen that I find my inclination leading me to extrapolate in one 
direction while the inclination of my observer leads him repeatedly to extrapolate in 
another direction. In such cases, since there is no convergence between me and my 
observer, the rule I thought I was following does not exist. My project of following a 
rule would be empty because it lacks a target. Both self-consistency and consistency 
within the group are necessary conditions. 
The hidden assumption here is that rules exist independently of their follow-
ers. This is certainly plausible. The rule, because it is being followed within a group, 
is, for that very reason, not completely dependent on any one single individual. To 
have a criterion of correctness, which is an essential feature of rule-following, one 
must have a certain distance between the rule and the rule-follower. Otherwise, one 
would end up with an impossible scenario, wherein, for example, all individuals just 
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decide as they go along on how to use words. The obvious result would be a dialogue 
de sourds.  
This account of rule-following, therefore, satisfies the two conditions for real-
ism. The first condition was that the subject matter under discussion allows a mind-
independent world. In this case, the rule itself is not dependent on the individual. The 
individual needs to negotiate with the community so as to ascertain that things are 
working well. The second condition for realism was that we could come to know 
something about the mind-independent world. On this account of rule-following, this 
is satisfied in the sense that the individual has a way of correctly following the rule 
determined by the community and thus a way of knowing ever more clearly what it is. 
On closer scrutiny, however, a problem arises with the first condition. Is it 
enough to say that since the rule is independent of the individual rule-follower, then it 
is mind-independent? It seems not. What we have in this account is a situation where 
the rule depends on the community as a whole. This covers the case of conventions: it 
covers rules like ‘Driving on the left side of the road is wrong’. But this is not enough 
for a robust sense of realism. It is not enough because the rule is not independent of 
the community as a whole. If, as regards criteria of correctness, we limit ourselves 
exclusively to the community as a whole, we would be in a situation similar to a choir 
with neither conductor nor score. The only criterion at work is for members of the 
choir to try to silence those singers whose notes are discordant with the harmony 
being attempted by the majority. This situation safeguards the idea of correctness as 
applied to the individual. What about the idea of correctness as applied to the whole 
group? 
To arrive at a more robust realism as regards rule-following, one must con-
sider how the community is constrained by states of affairs that go beyond the com-
munity itself. In other words, one must consider how the community is constrained by 
the nature of things, constrained by how the world is. Consider the set of all possible 
rules that a community can ever conceivably follow. We may call this a nomological 
space. A first major division of this space can be determined in terms of what is 
allowed by the physical laws of Nature and what isn’t. Consider for example the 
following rule: ‘No one can remain suspended in mid-air for more than 3 minutes’. 
This rule is definitely useless. Not that it doesn’t make logical sense. It is useless, or 
impossible, in the sense that it cannot be a rule in the kind of universe human rule-
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followers live in. Any practice of any group is in fact limited by, or contained within, 
non-conventional constraints. So we can forget about the naturally impossible rules, 
and concentrate on the rest of the nomological space, containing naturally possible 
rules. This set can be further subdivided into two groups: the conventionally possible 
rules and conventionally actual rules. Hence we may differentiate between, say, the 
rule ‘one should drive on the left’ from the corresponding rule ‘one should drive on 
the right’. Both are naturally possible, but one is conventionally actual, the other not. 
Further insight into this stronger realist account of rule-following may be 
gained by asking what can indeed act as a non-conventional constraint on practice. 
The first obvious set of constraints, as already mentioned, is determined by the 
boundaries of the physical laws of nature. The nature of things, therefore, becomes 
significant, at least in a negative way. Inasmuch as human rule-followers are physical 
things in the physical universe we know, they must act within these limits.  
Human rule-followers, however, are not just inanimate objects. They are also 
biological organisms. There are laws governing biological organisms over and above 
the laws of physics. Hence, biological systems, apart from being under the common 
laws of physics, show additional characteristics, for example the tendency to grow 
towards a fixed structure, the tendency to reproduce, and so on. Human rule-followers 
are biological organisms. Therefore, any practice they engage in must be constrained 
not only by the laws of physics, that constrain all things, but also by the more specific 
characteristics of biological organisms. For example, as animals are characterised by 
the tendency to care for their offspring, a human rule that goes against this tendency 
would be a rule outside the legitimate constraints for human practice. It should be 
noticed here that these constraints are non-conventional. On this view, a rule that goes 
against the care of human offspring should be considered bad or senseless not because 
of established trends within the community but because it would effectively be 
neglecting the fact that humans are not just things, but special kinds of things, namely 
living things. 
The final step may be taken by bringing in the further specification concerning 
humans. A human rule-follower is not only a thing constrained by the laws of physics, 
not only a biological organism constrained by the laws of living systems, but also a 
specific biological system characterised by rationality. To be true to their own speci-
fication, humans must engage in practices that do not go against rationality. This is 
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not to say that human practices cannot be neutral as regards reason. What the con-
straint is blocking are practices that are irrational: for example building society on 
principles of ethnic cleansing, or on the systematic propagation of lies. Such con-
straints are non-conventional.  
Admittedly, one can notice a difference in the binding force of the constraints 
mentioned so far. The constraints due to the laws of physics are rigid, in the sense that 
no thing can break the laws of physics. The constraints due to the characteristics of 
biological organisms are less rigid, in the sense that although all higher animals 
naturally care for their offspring, it is not inconceivable that one particular individual 
of the species neglects the constraint and still survives. The constraints due to the 
characteristics of human beings are even less rigid, in the sense that although all 
humans naturally act in accordance to reason, it is not inconceivable – in fact it is not 
rare – that one particular human person neglects the constraint by acting irrationally. 
In Aristotelian-Thomistic vocabulary, one would say that, as regards the practical 
judgement, because the factors in individual cases are indeterminably variable, a 
judgement concerning individual cases cannot be deduced with mathematical 
certainty but must be left to the prudentia of each person. The upshot here is that 
robust realism as regards rule-following involves referring to constraints that go 
beyond the community as a whole.1 
My general aim in this paper was not to argue explicitly for realism and 
against antirealism as regards rule-following. It was to determine more clearly what 
realists argue for if they want to argue for their position. This was done by showing 
what realism involves when applied to debates on rule-following. The account 
presented above shows that realism in rule-following involves not only the weak 
claim that rules to be followed are independent of the individual rule-follower, as 
                                                 
1  The account given here of non-conventional constraints on practice has been inspired by work done 
in the area of Natural Law, especially Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, Question 94, article 
2. As regards the inevitable reference to prudentia (or φρονησις ) for individual cases, the main 
reason seems to be the fact that we cannot, without falling into problems of infinite regress, conceive 
of rules for the correct application of rules. Aristotle was clear that ‘the whole account of matters of 
conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the beginning that the accounts we 
demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and 
questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account 
being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness.’ (Nicomachean 
Ethics, Bk II, Chap 2.). In moral matters, our apprehension does not work in the style of Cartesian-
deduction according to which we first fix the first principles and then deduce the particular case. See: 
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Ethics I, lect. 12; II, lect. 2.   
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conventions are. It involves also the stronger claim that conventional rules are 
constrained by non-conventional constraints. These constraints depend neither on the 
individual nor on the group. They arise from the nature of things. Human rule-
followers are constrained first by being material things in the universe that we know. 
They are constrained secondly by being living organisms. They are constrained as 
well by being rational. For a given practice, for example the practice of fishing or of 
celebrating birthdays, one may speak of the available space for possible conventional 
variety. From a realist point of view, this available space is limited. One cannot go 
fishing, or celebrate birthdays, in ways that go against the laws of physics, in ways 
that go against the general characteristics of biological organisms, in ways that go 
against right reason.  
Two points of clarification are in order here. The first concerns the naturalistic 
fallacy, which may creep into the argument if one is not careful. If one accepts the 
account presented here, one may conceive the possibility that, in certain areas of 
human living, the available space for conventional variety, is discovered to be very 
restricted. In these areas, what we ought to do will be less dependent on community 
conventions and more dependent on how things are. This is not to say that, in these 
cases, the ‘ought’ is being derived from the ‘is’. It means that knowledge of how 
things are is a presupposition of what ought to be done. The more we know how 
things are, including how we humans are, the better prepared we’ll be to determine 
correctly what we ought to do. Once we determine, in a certain domain and to a 
certain extent, what we ought to do, we’ll have a clearer idea of what being rational 
entails. 2  
The second point of clarification regards the meaning of the term ‘rational’ 
which should be well distinguished from ratiocinative. Rationality is not being taken 
to mean a system of rules, perhaps still unknown in their totality, common to all 
human beings, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted to have implied when using the 
term rational to distinguish humans from other animals. Rationality is here taken to 
mean the ability to arrive at intelligent judgement that goes beyond ratiocination, that 
cannot therefore be captured in a system of rules. One task in fact of rational 
assessment is to determine which rules much be followed in a given situation. The 
                                                 
2  John Finnis in his interpretation of Aquinas develops this point much further, not however in terms 
of rule-following. Cf. Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1980. 
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view I’m taking here is that even though there may be some logical rules that form a 
common element for all humans, one should allow that humans have cognitive 
limitations and can therefore be in a genuine situation of rational disagreement, which 
can only be resolved after the various philosophical traditions involved in the debate 
are well understood and appreciated by all.3 Learning more about human rationality 
will enable us to determine more easily what we ought to do, but this learning 
procedure is a long communitarian endeavour. 
Understood in these terms, realism in rule-following, because it allows a 
healthy symbiosis of conventional and non-conventional normativity, appears as an 
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